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1  Introduction
Hermann Cohen’s 1871 classic, Kants Theorie der Erfahrung, had a formative 
influence, not only on the Marburg school’s reading of Kant, but on their entire 
conception of philosophy. This influence was further magnified by the substanti-
ally revised and expanded second edition of 1885 and the yet further expanded 
third edition of 1918. Neo-Kantianism was the dominant philosophical movement 
in Germany in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which means that a 
work, ostensibly, of Kant scholarship had an influence on the development of Ger-
man philosophy that few works of secondary literature can claim.
Although Cohen’s reading of Kant was massively influential, it was, and 
remains, just as controversial. From the late nineteenth century to today, it has 
attracted everything from meticulous scholarly critique1 to brusque dismissal.2 
It has not fared significantly better even among Cohen scholars, many of whom 
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1E.g. Vaihinger’s careful point-by-point unraveling of Cohen’s reading of the Transcenden-
tal Aesthetic in Vaihinger 1887, vol. 2. Even Vaihinger allows his contempt to shine through at 
moments: “Unverständlich, wie so häufig, Cohen. Th. d. Erf.” (Vaihinger 1892, vol. 2, p. 138). 
Thanks to Des Hogan for pointing me to that remark.
2For instance, Heidegger: “die Absicht der Kritik der reinen Vernunft bleibt demnach grundsätz-
lich verkannt, wenn dieses Werk als ‘Theorie der Erfahrung’ oder gar als Theorie der positive 
Wissenschaft ausgelegt wird” (Heidegger 1929, pp. 16–17). Cf. Ebbinghaus, J. 1954.
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brush its interpretations aside as mistaken.3 The great scholar of Neo-Kantianism 
Klaus Köhnke begins his discussion of the Kant book by questioning whether it is 
really an historical interpretation at all.4 Cohen’s interpretation is something of a 
“dead dog” in the contemporary Kant literature as well. It is hard to find a single 
major living Kant scholars who discusses Cohen’s main interpretive claims in any 
detail. Even Michael Friedman, who evinces a deep appreciation for Cohen’s stu-
dent Ernst Cassirer, and, of contemporary Kant scholars, is the closest in spirit to 
Marburg, mentions Cohen in neither of his major works on Kant.5
It is not hard to explain why many have rejected Cohen’s reading. From reading 
the Deduction and the Aesthetic as depending on the Principles of Experience, to 
claiming that Dinge an sich selbst are the asymptotic limit of scientific inquiry, 
KTE (as I will abbreviate it) is replete with claims that historically and textually 
grounded readers of Kant are, I think, right to be suspicious of.6
In this essay I offer a partial rehabilitation of Cohen’s Kant interpretation. In 
particular, I will focus on the center of Cohen’s interpretation in KTE, reflected in 
the title itself: his interpretation of Kant’s concept of experience. “Kant hat einen 
neuen Begriff der Erfahrung entdeckt,”7 Cohen writes at the opening of the first 
edition of KTE (henceforth, KTE1), and while the exact nature of that new concept 
of experience is hard to pin down in the 1871 edition, he states it succinctly in the 
second edition (henceforth KTE2): experience is Newtonian mathematical natural 
science.8 While this equation of experience with mathematical natural science has 
few contemporary defenders, I believe it is substantially correct, with one impor-
tant qualification. Kant uses the term Erfahrung in a number of different senses 
in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (henceforth, KrV). I will argue that a central, and 
neglected, sense of that key technical term aligns with Cohen’s reading; what Kant 
6It should also be noted, that whatever its flaws, contemporary Kant scholarship is deeply indeb-
ted to KTE, one of the first works to attempt a rigorous, textually grounded interpretation of 
Kant’s thought. In doing so, KTE helped create the scholarly tradition that now largely rejects it.
7The very next sentence reads: “die Kritik der reinen Vernunft ist Kritik der Erfahrung.” I will not 
attempt to rehabilitate that claim, for, as many scholars have pointed out, the KrV is fundamen-
tally about the possibility of metaphysics, and only secondarily about experience (because the 
synthetic a priori cognitions of metaphysics are made possible by their relation to experience).
8“Kants Aufgabe ist also zunächst die Prüfung und Kennzeichnung des Erkenntniswertes und des 
Gewissheitsgrundes der Netwonschen Naturwissenshcaft, welche er be dem Drohwort der Erfah-
rung fasste” (KTE3, p. 93); in the first edition see KTE1, pp. 206, 208. On the development in 
Cohen’s reading of Kant see Edel’s Introduction to Werke I.1, pp. 20*, 22–23*.
3Köhnke (1986, pp. 273–275), Brandt (1993, pp. 37–54), Poma (1997, pp. 18, 48–53); and 
Kuehn (2009, pp. 115–121). Beiser (2014, p. 489) is more balanced, but ultimately is critical of 
Cohen’s reading.
4Köhnke (1986, p. 273). Cf. Luft (2015, pp. 43–48).
5Friedman (1992) and (2013). This, despite the fact that this sentence of Cohen’s could almost 
function as a summary of Friedman’s decade-long engagement with Kant and Newton: “the tran-
scendental method arose through a reflection upon the Philosophiae naturalis principia mathe-
matica” (KTE2, p. 67).
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sometimes refers to as ‘universal experience’ (sometimes, simply ‘experience’) is, 
in broad outlines, correctly interpreted by Cohen as mathematical natural science.
In §2 I distinguish several different senses in which Kant uses the key term 
Erfahrung, focusing on one of them, which, following Kant, I refer to as ‘univer-
sal experience.’ The next two sections are devoted to articulating precisely what 
universal experience is. In §3 I argue that one desideratum is that the universal 
experience must be able to play a key role in Kant’s transcendental idealism: the 
actual spatiotemporal objects there are, and their actual formally contingent pro-
perties (those not determined by the form of experience itself), are grounded in the 
content of universal experience. In §4 I provide an account of universal experience 
that meets this desideratum using a ‘limit’ construction.9 In §5 I summarize the 
core ideas of Cohen’s reading of Erfahrung as Newtonian mathematical natural 
science, prising apart what I take to be the salvageable core of his proposal from 
some of his less promising claims. In particular, I argue that Cohen was mistaken 
in identifying ‘universal experience’ with Newton’s specific scientific theory, or, 
for that matter, any particular scientific theory whatsoever. Universal experience, 
on my reading, is akin to what is now called “final science,” the complete scien-
tific account of all objects in space and time, which we never fully grasp, but, at 
best, asympototically approach through our continuing investigation of nature. I 
conclude by using this conception of universal experience to rehabilitate, partly, 
one of Cohen’s most notorious doctrines, his claim that things in themselves are 
the asymptotic limit of science (experience, on Cohen’s conception). I argue that 
this is correct for what Kant calls “things in themselves in the empirical sense,”10 
which I interpret as the fully contingent properties actually possessed by objects 
in space and time. Cohen is right to think that such properties are the properties 
objects are represented as having at the asymptotic limit of science (as defined in 
§4). However, he was wrong to conflate these “empirical things in themselves” 
with “transcendental things in themselves,” the non-spatiotemporal beings that 
appear to us as the spatiotemporal objects of experience/science.
If the argument of this paper is correct, our understanding of both Kant and 
Cohen must be revised. With respect to Kant, the central notion of at least the 
Transcendental Analytic, the possibility of experience, involves a much less per-
ceptual/phenomenological and much more scientific conception of experience than 
many have allowed. With respect to Cohen, Kants Theorie der Erfahrung not only 
9The closely related (though distinct) notion of the infinitesimal plays a key role in Cohen’s 
philosophical development after 1871 as well as in his mature theory of critical idealism. For 
reasons of space I cannot here discuss the relation between my invocation of the Bolzano-Weier-
strass ε-δ definition of limit and Cohen’s concept of the limit and the infinitesimal. For Cohen’s 
concept of limits and the infinitesimal method see PIM.
10An admittedly free rendering of this remark: “Denn in diesem Falle gilt das, was ursprüng-
lich selbst nur Erscheinung ist, z. B. eine Rose, im empirischen Verstande für ein Dinge an sich 
selbst” (A30/B45).
christian.damboeck@univie.ac.at
16 N.F. Stang
massively influenced the development of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Ger-
man philosophy, but, in doing so, offered a valuable corrective to a tendency, still 
prevalent today, to overlook a central notion of experience in KrV.
2  Different senses of Erfahrung in Kant
Although Erfahrung is one of the central notions of the KrV Kant uses this term 
in several different senses, without explicitly distinguishing them. In this section I 
attempt to prise apart these different senses.11
1. The common notion. One of the roles the concept of experience plays in the 
KrV is to express Kant’s disagreement with empiricist theories of cognition, like 
those of Locke and Hume. Kant denied what Locke and Hume maintained, that, 
in Kant’s words, all of our cognition “entspringt … aus Erfahrung” (B1). In order 
to express this disagreement Kant needs a ‘neutral’ concept of experience, one that 
does not contain specifically Kantian assumptions about the nature of experience. 
Otherwise, in claiming that Locke and Hume held that all cognition “entspringt 
aus” experience he would be attributing to the empiricists a doctrine they did not 
hold.
Indeed, in various passages we find Kant using “Erfahrung” to refer to a neu-
tral conception of experience, one that Locke and Hume could recognize.12 For 
instance, in the B Introduction Kant writes: “Erfahrung lehrt uns zwar, daß etwas 
so oder so beschaffen sei, aber nicht, daß es nicht anders sein könne (B3).”13 But 
in at least one sense of “experience,” Kantian experience does involve representing 
a necessary causal connection (see below), so in this passage, and others like it, 
he must mean “Erfahrung” in a different, less robust, sense. In this passage, then, 
Kant is giving the empiricists their due: there is a relatively minimal notion of 
experience, the empiricist one, on which experience does not tell us what is neces-
sarily the case.14
11I have explored some of the same themes in Stang (2015a). An earlier, less adequate, account of 
universal experience can be found in Stang (2012).
12Namely, ideas (Locke) or impressions (Hume) of sensation and reflection.
13The same sentence is repeated nearly word for word in Prol, Ak. 4:292.
14Another possibility is that there is an ambiguity in the notion of ‘necessity’ involved. Howe-
ver, if we accept the taxonomy of the kinds of necessity argued for in Stang (2011), this does 
not hold. For of the four kinds of necessity distinguished there—logical, formal, empirical, and 
noumenal–only two are relevant in this context (formal, empirical) and it is both the case that (a) 
Locke and Hume would deny that experience contains necessities of either kinds and (b) Kantian 
experience does acquaint us with such necessities. The conclusion argued for in the main text 
thus holds: Kant’s claim at B3 involves something other than his ‘official’ notion of experience, 
a more minimal notion of experience he is willing to deploy to express his (limited) agreement 
with the empiricists Locke and Hume. For more on Kantian modalities, see Stang (2016a).
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2. Empirical cognition. In some contexts, Kant defines experience as “empiri-
cal cognition” where “cognition” (Erkenntnis) refers to thinking a sensibly given 
object under a concept.15 On this definition, to experience (empirically cognize) 
an object is to think a sensibly given object under a concept. Although this ‘cogni-
tive’ notion of experience is one that Locke and Hume may have the philosophical 
resources to account for, it is not what they have in mind when they claim that all 
our ideas arise from experience.16 They mean something more minimal by ‘experi-
ence,’ roughly, any conscious sensory impression whatsoever.
3. Synthetic unity of perceptions. In what is perhaps the dominant use of the 
term “experience” in the KrV, Kant at several points defines experience as a syn-
thetic unity of perceptions.17 This definition is constitutively linked to the dis-
tinction between perception and experience, so we must first understand that 
distinction.18
Kant’s principal characterization of the distinction between these two kinds 
of representation is in terms of their relation to their object: perception of the 
intuition of an object versus experience of its existence.19 He defines perception 
as empirical consciousness of appearance (B162), which I take to mean: con-
sciously apprehending a manifold of empirical intuition. Apprehending a sensory 
17A110, A124 ff., A156/B195, B161, B218, A213/B260, and A183/B226.
18The Analogies of Experience are structured around the distinction between perception (Wahr-
nehmung) and experience (Erfahrung); see especially B218–219. In thinking about Kant’s tech-
nical notion of perception (Wahrnehmung), its difference from experience on the one hand and 
empirical intuition on the other, as well as its role in the Analogies, I have benefited tremend-
ously from reading Clinton Tolley’s unpublished paper “Kant on the distinction between per-
ception and experience.” My discussion in the rest of this section is deeply indebted to Tolley’s 
excellent work.
19Consider that the titles of the Principles of Experience, at least in the A Edition, speak of 
“Erscheinungen […] ihre Anschauung nach (Axiomen der Anschauung, A162)”, “das Reale, was 
ein Gegenstand der Empfindung ist” (Antizipationen der Wahrnehmung, A166), and finally “alle 
Erscheinungen stehen, ihrem Dasein nach, […]” (A176; my emphasis throughout). A160/B199, 
A178/B210. So we proceed from the principle of the intuition of appearances (Axioms) to the 
principle of the perception of reality in appearances (Anticipations) to the principle of the expe-
rience of their existence (Analogies). I owe appreciation of this point to Tolley “Kant on the dis-
tinction.”
15For instance, at B147 he writes that the categories “dienen nur zur Möglichkeit empirischer 
Erkenntnis. Diese aber heißt Erfahrung”; at the beginning of the same paragraph he writes: “sich 
einen Gegenstand denken und einen Gegenstand erkennen, ist also nicht einerlei. Zum Erkennt-
nisse gehören nämlich zwei Stücke: erstlich der Begriff, dadurch überhaupt ein Gegenstand 
gedacht wird (die Kategorie), und zweitens die Anschauung, dadurch er gegeben wird” (B146).
16This corresponds, roughly, to applying an abstract idea to an idea of sensation or reflection 
(Locke) or applying an abstracted idea to an impression of sensation or reflection (Hume). It 
would make no sense for Locke or Hume to claim that all of our ideas arise from experience in 
this Kantian ‘cognitive’ sense (experience #2), for experience is here defined in terms of applying 
an idea to a sensory impression.
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manifold is being conscious of a single spatial (outer) or temporal (inner) field in 
which there is qualitative differentiation and being conscious of it as such.20 The 
difference between perceiving and experiencing is the difference between being 
consciously aware of a sensory manifold (qualitatively differentiated spatial or 
temporal field) and thinking of that sensory manifold as the appearing of some 
object in space.21 When Kant claims that we experience the existence of an object 
I take him to mean: we experience an object as existing in some public intersub-
jectively accessible space, an object that can be experienced by different subjects 
and reidentified over time. 22
This is the sense of experience Kant is trying to capture when he announces in 
the B edition that the principle of the Analogies of Experience is that “experience 
is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of percep-
tions” (B218). Representing a perceived object (an object whose sensory manifold 
we consciously apprehend) as existing requires synthesizing various actual and 
counterfactual perceptions (perceptions we would have under the right conditions) 
using the pure concepts of the understanding, in particular, the categories of rela-
tion. The argument of the Analogies is that this combination of perceived mani-
folds requires combining them according to necessary laws corresponding to each 
category of relation. While it is not clear that anything in Kant’s complex taxo-
nomy of the mind and its states corresponds to the contemporary notion of ‘per-
ceptual experience’ this notion of experience (synthesized unity of perceptions) 
comes closest: a perceptual awareness of a public object available for perception 
by other subjects and reidentifiable across perceptions. Consequently, I will refer 
to it as perceptual experience, or p-experience for short. To wrap up a loose end, 
20Kant writes in the A Deduction: “das erste, was uns gegeben wird, ist Erscheinung, welche, wenn 
sie mit Bewusstsein verbunden ist, Wahrnehmung heißt […] Weil aber jede Erscheinung ein Man-
nigfaltiges enthält, mithin verschiedene Wahrnehmungen in Gemüte an sich zerstreut und einzeln 
angetroffen werden, so ist eine Verbindung derselben nötig, welche sie in dem Sinne selbst nicht 
haben können. Es ist als in uns ein tätiges Vermögen der Synthesis eises Mannigfaltigen, welches 
wir Einbildungskraft nennen, und deren unmittelbar an den Wahrnehmungen ausgeübte Handlung 
ich Apprehension nenne. Die Einbildungskraft soll nämlich das Mannigfaltige der Anschauung in 
ein Bild bringen; welcher muß sie also die Eindrücke in ihre Tätigkeit aufnehmen, d. i. apprehen-
dieren” (A120). Again, thanks to Clinton Tolley for drawing my attention to passages like this.
21I mean ‘appearing’ here in the empirical sense, in which it is used to mark the difference 
between the real empirical properties of objects in space and time (phenomena) and how they 
appear to perceivers’ sense organs at a given time under given conditions. The transcendental 
sense of ‘appearing’ marks the difference between the real empirical properties of objects in 
space and time (phenomena) and their unknowable inner constitution (noumena). In this paper 
I am trying to remain as neutral as possible on the second distinction, which has received the 
lion’s share of attention from commentators on Kant’s idealism. For the empirical appearance/
thing in itself distinction, and its difference from the transcendental distinction, see A29–30/B45 
and A45–46/B62–63.
22By ‘existence’ he cannot mean the causal efficacy of the object, as he seems to in other contexts 
(e.g. Ak. 4:468), for that would render the conclusion of the second and third Analogies nearly 
trivial: to represent an object as causally efficacious we must represent is using the categories 
<cause-effect> and <community>.
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perception and experience, in Kant’s technical sense, are both instances of experi-
ence in sense #2: they both involve thinking a sensibly given object under a con-
cept, either a sensory manifold (perception) or an existing object (experience).23
4. Causal-hypothetical experience. Kant’s core examples of experience in the 
Analogies are examples where I represent some consciously apprehended sense 
manifold as the direct appearing of an existing (publicly available) object. For 
instance, I see a boat sailing downstream or the parts of a house.24 However, in 
the Postulate of Actuality Kant introduces the possibility of experiencing an object 
‘indirectly’ when he claims that I can experience an all-pervading magnetic matter 
(we would now say ‘magnetic field’) by experiencing the movement of iron filings 
in the presence of a magnet, and inferring, by the Second Analogy, some medium 
by which the magnet moves the iron filings.25 This kind of case does not fit the 
model of p-experience described above because, in cases like this, the perceived 
sensory manifold is not an appearance of the experienced object (the magnetic 
field). Instead, the relation is more indirect: the sensory manifold is the appea-
rance of the moving iron filings, from which I infer the existence of the magnetic 
field. To mark the difference between this more indirect notion of experience and 
p-experience I will refer to it as causal-hypothetical or ch-experience.
In the Postulate of Actuality Kant emphasizes that the difference between what 
I am calling p-experience and ch-experience depends on the contingent limita-
tions of our sense organs.26 Since transcendental philosophy is supposed to abs-
tract from contingent facts like these, the difference between p-experience and 
ch-experience is not very significant for transcendental philosophy. He goes on to 
assert a constitutive tie between these two kind of experience: anything that can be 
an object of ch-experience can also be an object of p-experience for some discur-
sive spatiotemporal intellect, though not necessarily one with our contingent sense 
organs.27 Any object that causally interacts with the objects we directly p-experi-
ence is such as to be directly detectable by a discursive spatiotemporal intellect 
with appropriately constituted sense organs. Since all objects in space and time 
causally interact with the objects we directly p-experience (Third Analogy) it fol-
lows that all objects of ch-experience are such as to be directly detectable by a 
discursive spatiotemporal intellect with appropriately constituted sense organs. 
23Kant makes this point about experience in sense #3 (synthetic unity of perceptions) at B218, 
but it follows immediately from his definition of experience (#2 on my reading) as empirical 
cognition at B147 and the discussions of intuition and perception in the Axioms and the Antici-
pations.
24A192/B237 and A190/B235, respectively.
25A225–226/B273.
26“Denn überhaupt würden wir, nach Gesetzen der Sinnlichkeit und dem Kontext unserer Wahr-
nehmung, in einer Erfahrung auch auf die unmittelbare empirische Anschauung derselben sto-
ßen, wenn unsere Sinnen feiner wären, deren Grobheit die Form möglicher Erfahrung überhaupt 
nichts angeht” (A226/B273).
27A226/B273.
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Consequently, I will refer to p-experience and ch-experience collectively as pch-
experiences. Pch-experience includes everything of which we have direct percep-
tual experience (p-experience) as well as everything that is posited to explain the 
objects of our direct perceptual experience (ch-experience) through spatiotemporal 
causal interaction governed by the Analogies of Experience.28
5. Universal experience. In other contexts, though, Kant defines experience 
as a maximal unity of such perceptual and causal-hypothetical experiences. For 
instance, in the A Deduction he writes: 
Es ist nur eine Erfahrung, in welcher alle Wahrnehmungen als im durchgängigen und 
gesetzmäßigen Zusammenhange vorgestellt werden: ebenso, wie nur ein Raum und Zeit 
ist, in welcher all Formen der Erscheinung und alles Verhältnis des Seins oder Nichtseins 
stattfinden. Wenn man von verschiedenen Erfahrungen spricht, so sind es nur so viel 
Wahrnehmungen, sofern solche zu einer und derselben allgemeinen Erfahrung gehören. 
(A110)29
I will refer to this notion of experience as universal experience, or u-experience 
for short. To understand Kant’s notion of universal experience it will be helpful to 
contrast it with pch-experience. First of all, as Kant says quite clearly, there can be 
only one u-experience, but there can be multiple pch-experiences: my experience 
of this table, this piece of paper, the magnetic field, the solar system, etc. If we 
take him at his word, this means there is only one u-experience period: that you 
and I do not have different u-experiences, but our pch-experiences count as expe-
rience (in the ‘universal’ sense) only to the extent that they cohere with one inter-
subjectively valid u-experience. Secondly, there are pch-experiences that are not 
part of the single u-experience; for instance, if I p-experience this chair as being 
taller than this table, but later experiences do not cohere with this, then the “com-
plete and lawful connection of all experiences” does not represent this chair as 
being taller than this table, so my p-experience is not part of the content of the one 
single u-experience. Likewise, if I posit the existence of a magnetic field to explain 
the movement of iron filings but later discover that this is due to some other cause, 
my initial pch-experience of the magnetic matter does not count as an experience 
in the more demanding sense of A110 (it does not cohere with the “complete and 
lawful connection of all experience”). Thirdly, the content of u-experience will 
be much more complex and more determinate than the content of any single pch-
experience; my pch-experience may represent some regularity and some degree of 
lawfulness in its objects, and represents them as determinate in respect of some 
properties (e.g. causal properties), but u-experience represents all such objects in 
“durchgängig und gesetzmäßigen Zusammenhang” with one another; the degree 
28“Wo also Wahrnehmung und deren Anhang nach empirischen Gesetzen hinreicht, dahin reicht 
auch unsere Erkenntnis vom Dasein der Dinge” (A226/B273).
29One also finds the idea of a single ‘universal’ experience at A230/B283, A493/B521, A495/
B524, and A582/B610.
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of lawfulness and regularity in its content will be much greater, and it will repre-
sent its objects as determinate with respect to a wider range of properties than any 
individual pch-experience does.
3  Universal Experience and Transcendental Idealism
In the next two sections I go into more detail about u-experience, which, as I will 
argue in §5, most closely corresponds to Cohen’s conception of Erfahrung. My 
method will be somewhat indirect. In this section, I will argue that u-experience 
must play a particular role in Kant’s transcendental idealism: it must ground the 
actual formally contingent properties of objects. In the next section I offer a cons-
truction of u-experience on which it can do precisely that. In neither of these two 
sections is my argument primarily textual; instead, I try to make explicit aspects of 
Kant’s notion of universal experience that remain, for the most part, implicit in the 
KrV.30
The possibility of objects in space and time having various properties (e.g. 
causal properties) depends upon, or consists in, the possibility of our experien-
cing such objects as having these properties. This much is relatively clear from 
the KrV and is relatively uncontroversial among Kant scholars. However, matters 
become much less clear and uncontroversial when we turn to actuality. Consider 
that the particular objects we experience in space and time are not mandated by 
the forms of experience alone; it is contingent, given our sensible and intellectual 
forms of experience, that these objects exist.31 Consider further that many of their 
fully determinate spatiotemporal positions and causal powers (e.g. the laws that 
govern their interaction) are not mandated by the forms of experience either. I will 
call these formally contingent properties, properties that are compatible with the 
forms of experience (hence they are formally possible) but which are not grounded 
in the forms of experience (hence they are not formally necessary).32 What is it 
in virtue of which there are the objects in space and time there actually are, with 
the formally contingent properties they actually have? What grounds actuality? To 
answer these questions fully we need to fill in these blanks:
30The material in this section dovetails with the discussion in Stang (2016b), where I use similar 
arguments to critique the interpretation of Allais (2015).
31This holds true regardless of which specific notion of experience from §1 we have in mind.
32These notions are defined as follows in Stang (2011) (cf. Stang 2016, Sect. 7.3):
Formal possibility It is formally possible that p just in case it is compatible with our forms of 
experience that p.
Formal necessity It is formally necessary that p just in case it is incompatible with our forms of 
experience that not-p.
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(Ex)  There is actually an object in space and time that has formally contingent 
property F if and only if ___.
(Prop)  Where x is an object in space and time, x has formally contingent pro-
perty F, if and only if ___.33
It is understood, in both cases, that the left-hand side of the biconditional is true 
in virtue of the right-hand side. We are not looking merely for necessary and suf-
ficient conditions; we are looking for the grounds of the left-hand side. To take a 
concrete example, let us assume that there actually is a spatiotemporal object in 
some distant region of space R. What grounds this fact? Knowing how to answer 
this question in general is knowing how to fill in the blank in (Ex); in the example, 
F is the property of being an object in region R.
To answer these questions the natural place to turn is the Postulates of Empi-
rical Thinking in General, in particular the Postulate of Actuality: “was mit den 
materialen Bedingungen der Erfahrung (der Empfindung) zusammenhängt, ist 
wirklich” (A218/B266). In the further discussion of this Postulate Kant makes a 
point we discussed above: we can experience objects we cannot perceive (A225/
B272). In my terminology this means we can experience objects we cannot 
p-experience and I coined the term ch-experience (more generally, pch-experi-
ence) to cover such cases. In the next paragraph Kant writes:
Man kann aber auch vor der Wahrnehmung des Dinges, und also comparative a priori das 
Dasein derselben erkennen, wenn es nur mit einigen Wahrnehmungen, nach den Grund-
sätzen der empirischen Verknüpfung derselben (den Analogien) zusammenhängen. (A225/
B272)
On one reading of this passage Kant is claiming that what is actual is what stands 
in causal relation to what we perceive. On such a reading, Kant is offering this 
account of what grounds the actual existence of objects in space and time:
(Ex.1)   There is actually an object in space and time that has formally contingent 
property F if and only if (i) there is actually an object in space and time that 
has property F and (ii) it stands in causal connection with our perceptions.
But notice that (i) is merely the antecedent of (Ex. 1); this analysis is circular. 
If we weaken (i) to the requirement that there possibly is an object in space and 
time that has property F then we get absurd results. Kant’s definition of possibi-
lity in the Postulates is “was mit den formalen Bedingungen der Erfahrung (der 
Anschauung und den Begriffen nach) übereinkommt, ist möglich” (A218/B265). 
33These formulae have to be distinguished because existence is not a real predicate; we cannot 
assimilate the fact there is an object with property F to the fact that this object has some other 
property, e.g. the property of existing. Consequently, existential facts need to be formulated in 
general terms, as in Ex (e.g. there is an x such that Fx). The left-hand side of (3) should not have 
the form ‘appearance a exists’ because existence is not a predicate some objects have and others 
lack—in other words, if the sentence ‘Appearance a exists’ is well-formed (the singular term 
refers) then it is true. See Stang (2015b) and (2016a) for further discussion.
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This would entail that for every object whose interaction with what we perceive is 
consistent with the intellectual and sensible form of our experience, there actually 
is such an object. For instance, if it is consistent with the intellectual and sensible 
form of our experience that the motion of iron filings in the presence of a magnet 
is due to the presence of an immediate magnetic attraction-at-a-distance, and it is 
consistent with those forms that it is due to an “all-pervading” magnetic matter, 
then both exist. This, I take it, is absurd.
Another possibility suggested by the Postulates discussion of actuality might 
be:
(Ex.2)   There is actually an object in space and time that has formally contingent 
property F if and only if we pch-experience such an object on the basis 
of our actual perceptions.
But this has implausible consequences all its own: it entails that what actually 
exists now is exhausted by what we pch-experience now. Consequently, as our sci-
entific understanding of nature increases and we pch-experience more of it, previ-
ously non-existent entities come into existence. But Kant is a scientific realist in 
at least this weak sense: he thinks there are things in the physical universe that we 
have not yet discovered. We do not create them in scientific inquiry.34
Some readers might wonder whether Kant needs an answer to the questions I 
have posed, i.e. whether he needs to be able to fill in the blanks in (Ex) and (Prop). 
Kant could, on this line of thought, rest content with an epistemic account of how 
we can have knowledge of actuality (through perception and the transcendental 
principles of experience) but does not require a metaphysical account of what it is 
in virtue of which the objects there actually are exist and have their actual formally 
contingent properties. However, I do not think Kant intended to rest content with 
an epistemic account, nor do I think he could do so, consistent with his other theo-
retical commitments. The Postulates are principles that give the meaning of modal 
categories, when those categories are applied to spatiotemporal phenomena.35 
They are not merely epistemic principles of how we can acquire epistemic warrant 
for judgments about such phenomena.36
But there are purely philosophical reasons why Kant requires an answer to (Ex) 
and (Prop). Consider what I will refer to as the skeptical scenario: our scientific 
theory of the natural world, even at its idealized limit, is inaccurate about what 
spatiotemporal phenomena there actually are and what (formally contingent) pro-
perties they have. In the next section I will go into significant further detail about 
34See Allais (2015, p. 47) and Langton (1998, pp. 144–145) for discussion.
35“Eben um deswillen sind auch die Grundsätze der Modalität nichts weiter, als Erklärungen der 
Begriffe der Möglichkeit, Wirklichkeit und Notwendigkeit in ihrem empirischen Gebrauche” 
(A219/B266).
36The Postulate of possibility (quoted in the main text) does give, for instance, merely episte-
mic conditions under which we can obtain justification for judgments about possibility. It tells us 
what possibility is for empirical objects (see previous note).
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what the “idealized limit of natural scientific theory” is, but here it will suffice to 
offer a mere sketch. In the skeptical scenario our natural scientific theorizing even-
tually converges to a stable equilibrium theory about what objects there are and 
what formally contingent properties they have, and after a certain point it never 
changes (other than to further refine predicted values of magnitudes within a limi-
ted range). I take it that the skeptical scenario, where such an idealized scientific 
theory is false, is impossible given Kant’s transcendental idealist theory of spati-
otemporal objects (the subject matter of natural scientific theories). If it were pos-
sible for our natural-scientific experience, even at its idealized limit, to be false 
of physical objects in space and time, I do not know how it could be the case, as 
Kant states, that “es sind demnach die Gegenstände der Erfahrung niemals an sich, 
sondern nur in der Erfahrung gegeben, und existieren außer derselben gar nicht” 
(A493/B520).37 Kant therefore must deny that the skeptical scenario is possible. 
What is more, he needs an explanation of why the skeptical scenario is impossible, 
which must take the form of an account of what it is in virtue of which there are 
the spatiotemporal objects there actually are with the formally contingent proper-
ties they actually have, which explains why idealized natural-scientific experience 
cannot be inaccurate about these matters.
The next obvious place to turn in the KrV for an answer to (Ex) and (Prop) 
is the section of the “Antinomial conflicts of pure reason” titled “Transcendental 
idealism as the key to solving the cosmological dialectic” (A490–507/B518–535). 
Kant says several things in that section that suggest an answer along the lines 
of (Ex.1) or (Ex.2).38 However, some remarks in this section suggest a modal or 
counterfactual answer to (Ex), for instance: 
daß es Einwohner im Monde geben könne, ob sie gleich kein Mensch jemals warhgenom-
men hat, muß allerdings eingeräumet werden, aber es bedeutet nur so viel: daß wir in dem 
möglichen Fortschritt der Erfahrung auf sie treffen könnten (A492-3/B521).
This naturally suggests the following account:
(Ex.3)   There is actually an object in space and time that has formally contingent 
property F if and only if we could experience an object with property F.
But we now have the same problem that such a modal analysis faced above. If it 
is consistent with the forms of experience that we experience a unicorn in R, on 
37The possibility of the skeptical scenario should not be confused with the fact that objects we 
experience are the appearances of things we can never know, or that perhaps the very objects we 
experience also have inner natures we can never know (depending on how one interprets Kant’s 
transcendental idealism). The skeptical scenario concerns how these things in themselves appear 
to us, not how they are in themselves. In the skeptical scenario, the existence of these appearan-
ces and their empirical properties (how they appear to us) could be in principle inaccessible to 
our natural-scientific experience.
38E.g. “alles ist wirklich, was mit einer Wahrnhemung nach Gesetzen des empirischen Fortgangs 
in einem Kontext steht. Sie sind also alsdenn wirklich, wenn sie mit meinem wirklichen Bewußt-
sein in einem empirischen Zusammenhange stehen, ob sie gleich darum nicht an sich, d.i. außer 
diesem Fortschritt der Erfahrung, wirklich sind” (A493/B521).
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this analysis, it follows that there actually is a unicorn in R. Matters are not helped 
if, to anticipate the next section slightly, we understand possible experience here 
as possible u-experience, the “totality” of experience we discussed briefly in §2. 
Formally possible u-experience is experience compatible with the form of u-expe-
rience, but the matter of u-experience is not determined by its form alone. So any 
object, experience of which is compatible with the form of u-experience, actually 
exists, according to (Ex.3). As before, this massively over-generates actual objects.
Elsewhere, Kant suggests a conditional analysis of actuality: “vor der Wahrneh-
mung eine Erscheinung ein wirkliches Ding nennen, bedeutet entweder, daß wir 
im Fortgang der Erfahrung auf eine solche Wahrnehmung treffen müssen, oder es 
hat gar keine Bedeutung” (A493/B521). Kant’s idea seems to be that, prior to per-
ceiving an object, to judge that it actually exists is to judge that if we were in the 
right conditions (if we were to continue the “Fortgang” of experiences appropria-
tely) we must experience such an object. More formally:
(Ex.4)   There is actually an object in space and time that has formally contingent 
property F if and only if [(a discursive spatiotemporal intellect is in the 
right conditions) → (that intellect experiences an object with property F)].
where → indicates some form of conditional relation. The difficult issue is how to 
understand this conditional. We cannot understand it as a material condition (p ⊃ 
q), for, in the example above, if we never travel to region R or perform the obser-
vations necessary to determine whether it is occupied (e.g. using a telescope), the 
conditional would be trivially true, and it would follow that there is such an object. 
This has the absurd result that for every kind of object such that we will never be 
in the right conditions to experience such an object (e.g. unicorns in region R), 
there actually exists an object of that kind.
Nor can we understand it in terms of the ‘strict’ or necessitated conditional 
((p ⊃ q)), as might be suggested by Kant’s invocation of what we “treffen müs-
sen,” for this would raise the question of what sense of necessity is involved here. 
Since the only relevant notion of necessity is formal necessity (what obtains in 
virtue of the forms of experience)39, this would entail in turn that it is inconsistent 
with the forms of experience that we be in the relevant conditions and fail to expe-
rience the object in question. This seems implausible. For instance, the ‘right con-
ditions’ to experience a visible object are, intuitively, having a properly constituted 
visual system, having sufficient lighting, etc. But the forms of experience are no 
guarantee that we will not simply fail to see something in our field of vision.
Alternatively, we might read the counterfactual as a ‘could’ counterfactual 
(p ◇→ q): if it were the case that p then it could be the case that q. But this is 
too weak, for reasons related to the failure of the ‘strict’ conditional reading. The 
‘could’ counterfactual might hold in a case where the antecedent of (Ex.4) (that 
there is such an object) does not, for some reason unrelated to the existence or non-
existence of the object. For instance, if I were to travel to a distant spatiotemporal 
39Cf. Stang (2011) and Stang (2016a, Sect. 9.3).
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region R I could or might receive sensory matter that would be formed into an expe-
rience of a unicorn, but this would be due to a malfunction in my measuring device 
or my sense organs. This does not entail that R is occupied by a unicorn.
The best bet for the counterfactual analysis, then, is to interpret the counterfac-
tual as a ‘would’ counterfactual:
(Ex.5)   There is actually an object in space and time that has formally contingent 
property F if and only if [(a discursive spatiotemporal intellect is in the 
right conditions) → (that intellect experiences an object with property F)].
A corresponding version of (Prop) can easily be formulated:
(Prop.5)   Where x is an object in space and time, x has formally contingent pro-
perty G, if and only if [(a discursive spatiotemporal intellect is in the 
right conditions) → (that intellect experiences x as having property G)].
On this view, the ultimate ground of the existence of particular objects in space 
and time and their possession of their actual formally contingent properties is a 
subjunctive fact: what we would experience under certain conditions.
However, for this to be a viable option we need to say more about the antece-
dent of the ‘would’ counterfactual. Consider the following. It might be that if we 
were to investigate spatiotemporal region R we would find it occupied with matter 
with certain determinate actual properties, but if we were then to obtain a more 
comprehensive experience of the larger region R* of which region R is a sub-
region, we would discover that our initial experience was mistaken: the objects in 
R have somewhat different properties then we initially thought, and our mistake 
was due to failing to consider their relation to the objects in the rest of R*. In this 
case, (Ex.5) as formulated has the counterintuitive result that the objects in R actu-
ally have the properties we initially experienced them to have.
To make this more concrete, consider the natural-scientific case on which Kant 
focused the most attention: Newton’s determination of the true motions of the 
planets. On one influential reading of Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Natur-
wissenschaft (MAdN) Kant there reconstructs the process by which Newton con-
structed an inertial reference frame (a reference frame in which the three laws of 
motion are satisfied) in which to determine the true motions of the planets.40 The 
true motion of a body is not its motion with respect to absolute space, for that 
is not an object of possible experience,41 nor is it the motion it has with respect 
to any particular reference frame (what Kant calls an “empirical space”), for of 
any two reference frames in uniform rectilinear motion no possible experience 
40I am guided here by the interpretation of Friedman (1992); his interpretation is somewhat 
modified in Friedman (2013). On this point, I agree more with Friedman’s earlier interpretation, 
though I do not have space here to explain my disagreements with the finer points of the meticu-
lous analyses in Friedman (2013).
41MAdN, Ak. 4:559.
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can decide which is the ‘correct’ one.42 In Kantian terms, this means that the true 
motions of bodies are objects of possible experience up to equivalence of inertial 
reference frames in uniform rectilinear motion; consequently, only the acceleration 
of a body (which does not vary across the family of inertial frames) is a true pro-
perty of the body (rather than a property that can be attributed either to the motion 
of the body or to the motion of the observer’s reference frame).43
We determine the true motion (acceleration) of the Earth by finding a reference 
frame that takes the center of the solar system (which happens to be within the 
sun itself) to be stationary, the center-of-mass frame.44 But within this Newtonian 
project, one cannot stop with the center-of-mass frame of the solar system, for 
the solar system is rotating around the galactic center, thus subject to an attractive 
force towards that galactic center. Within a frame that takes the center of mass of 
the solar system to be stationary, the distant stars are undergoing an uncompensa-
ted force (a force that violates the first law of motion): they are rotating around the 
center of our solar system, thus being attracted to it (because they are undergoing 
an instantaneous change in velocity), without exerting a compensating force on 
that center. The solution is to construct a center-of-mass frame for the Milky Way 
itself, then for our local galactic group, the Virgo supercluster, etc.
To bring this example back to our discussion from earlier, the motions (acce-
lerations) of the planets relative to the center-of-mass frame of the solar system 
are not their true motions simpliciter for they are motions within a very nearly but 
not exactly inertial frame (the motions of the distant stars violate the first law of 
motion in that frame). The motions of the planets within the solar system center-
of-mass frame are very close approximations to their true motions. To get a closer 
approximation we need to proceed to the center-of-mass frame of the galaxy, 
which will be very nearly but not quite inertial (for the more distant galaxies are 
rotating around the Milky Way in this frame, thus being attracted to the Milky Way 
galactic center of mass without a compensating force).45 Therefore, the actual 
formally contingent properties of the Earth, in particular, its actual acceleration 
(which is formally contingent because it is not grounded solely in the forms of 
experience), are not the properties we would experience the Earth to have on the 
basis of a relatively complete pch-experience (e.g. the pch-experience constituted 
by Newton’s complex calculation of the acceleration of the Earth relative to the 
center-of-mass frame of the solar system), but the properties we would experience 
the Earth to have on the basis of this process of constructing ever more complete 
experiences that asymptotically approach the true acceleration of the Earth. In 
other words, we need to revise (Prop.5) to:
42MAdN, Ak. 4:555–556.
43See the discussion of ‘alternative’ judgments at Ak. 4:556 and the footnote at 559–560.
44This relies on reading MAdN as a reconstruction, within the contours of Kantian transcendental 
philosophy, of Newton’s project in the Principia. On this point see Friedman (1992, pp. 159–
164) and the much more extensive discussion in Friedman (2013, esp. pp. 531–561).
45Cf. Friedman (1992, pp. 47–48), and Friedman (2013, pp. 156–158, 534–536).
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(Prop.6)   Where x is an object in space and time, x has formally contingent pro-
perty G, if and only if [(a discursive spatiotemporal intellect has uni-
versal experience) → (that universal experience represents x as having 
property G)].
A corresponding version of (Ex) can easily be formulated. This is why the skepti-
cal scenario from above is impossible. If we were to construct ever more complete 
pch-experiences of objects, the resulting universal experience could not be inaccu-
rate about which objects there actually are and which formally contingent proper-
ties they actually have, for these facts are grounded in how universal experience 
would represent objects if we had universal experience (if were to construct ever 
more complete pch-experiences).
By itself this is not especially informative because I have not yet said very 
much about the structure of universal experience. The point of this section, 
instead, has been to argue that universal experience plays a particular role in 
Kant’s transcendental idealist view of spatiotemporal phenomena: it is the content 
of universal experience that grounds the existence of particular objects in space 
and time and their possession of their actual formally contingent properties. In the 
next section I will explain the form of universal experience, guided by this cru-
cial desideratum: the form of u-experience must equip it to play this role in Kant’s 
transcendental idealism.46
4  The Form of Universal Experience
I want to begin by picking up on two threads from the previous section. The first 
thread is that the process of constructing ever more complete pch-experiences 
(e.g. center-of-mass frames for the solar system, Milky Way, local group, Virgo 
supercluster, etc.) is in principle indefinitely continuable. The result of the first 
Antinomy is that we cannot say that the world in space and time is infinite, but 
neither can we say that it is finite: the progression from experience of one part of 
the world to experience of a more complete part can continue indefinitely. This 
means that whatever ‘universal experience’ is it is not the experience we have at 
46One of the most important passages in the “Transcendental idealism as key” section is ambi-
guous on what kind of modal/subjunctive analysis Kant wants to employ: “Es ist im Ausgange 
ganz einerlei, ob ich sage, ich könne im empirisichen Fortgange im Raume auf Sterne treffen, 
die hundertmal weiter entfernt sind, als die äußersten, die ich sehe: oder ob ich sage, es sind viel-
leicht deren im Weltraume anzutreffen, wenn sie gleich niemals ein Mensch wahrgenommen hat, 
oder wahrgenommen wird” (A496/B524). I have argued though that it is very much not “einer-
lei” whether we say that there actually are such distant stars in virtue of the fact that we could 
experience them (too weak), or in virtue of the fact that they are there to be experienced (this is 
circular), or in virtue of the fact that if were in the right conditions we might experience them 
(too strong). I have argued that Kant should have said explicitly that we would experience them 
“im empirisichen Fortgange im Raume” if that “Fortgang” continued far enough.
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the ‘end’ of this process, for this process continues without end, ad indefinitum. 
Consequently, we are necessarily never in possession of the ‘complete’ u-expe-
rience. The second is that, since there can be only one u-experience (“the single 
all-encompassing experience”), none of these ever more complete experiences are 
themselves u-experience. Since they are not u-experience, given the varieties of 
experience distinguished in §1, they must be pch-experiences: relatively complete 
experiences of perceived and causally-hypothesized objects.
In the previous section, to give our quite abstract discussion a more concrete 
shape, I focused on the example of constructing ever more inclusive reference 
frames (empirical spaces) within Kant’s reconstruction of Newton’s physics. But 
this is merely a concrete example of Kant’s theory of experience, not the theory 
itself, so we need to abstract from the details of that construction in order to see 
the form of u-experience itself.
That form, as the discussion in the last two paragraphs has indicated, consists 
in a series of ever more complete pch-experiences. To make this more precise, 
we need a more precise account of what makes one pch-experience more com-
plete than another. We will say that a pch-experience E* is more complete than 
pch-experience E just in case E* either (i) includes a larger spatial region than 
E or (ii) includes a wider range of objects within the same spatial region than E 
or (iii) includes a wider range of formally contingent properties than E, but does 
not include (i*) a narrower spatial region, nor (ii*) a narrower range of objects, 
nor (iii*) a narrower range of properties. For instance, if E is a pch-experience 
of a certain set of objects within a certain spatial region that represents a certain 
class of formally contingent properties of those objects, then a pch-experience can 
be more complete than E either by expanding the spatial region it represents, by 
representing objects not represented in E (e.g. the parts of the objects in E), or 
by considering formally contingent properties not considered by E, but it cannot 
be restricted in any of these areas compared to E. I will assume that being more 
complete than is a strict ordering on experiences: it is asymmetric, irreflexive, and 
transitive.
We now have the materials to define a series of more complete experiences: a 
set of pch-experiences such that for every experience E in the series there is an 
experience E* in the series that is more complete than E. This does not yet tell 
us where to fit u-experience into this construction, but before we do that I want 
to address a limitation in the construction so far. As I have defined the series, it is 
possible to have a series that remains within a certain spatial region. For ease of 
exposition, let us start with an experience within the 1-unit radius sphere around 
<0,0,0> (e.g. let the unit be the average distance of Pluto from the sun and <0, 0, 
0> be the center of mass of the solar system). Each experience En represents the 
sphere of radius 2–1/(n+1), where n is any natural number. For any m and n, the 
range of Em (the sphere of radius 2–1/(m+1)) will be greater than the range of En 
(the sphere of radius 2–1/(n+1)) if and only if m>n and E. It can be easily 
checked that {En} satisfies the definition of a series of more complete experiences. 
But {En} never breaks out of the sphere of radius 2 around <0,0,0>, even though 
each experience is more complete than the experiences ‘prior’ to it.
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To avoid this problem we need to impose the requirement that the series of 
more complete experiences is unbounded, and unbounded in three respects: (i) 
unbounded in spatial region, (ii) unbounded in domain, and (iii) unbounded in the 
properties it represents. With respect to (i) we need to impose the requirement that 
for any bounded region R of space there is an experience E in the series such that 
R is a proper sub-region of the region experienced in E. With respect to (ii) matters 
are somewhat more complicated. We cannot say that every object must be repre-
sented by some experience in the series, for the very question at stake ((Ex) from 
earlier) is which objects there are, and since we are going to use the content of 
universal experience to answer this question, we cannot quantify over all objects 
in the construction of universal experience itself. Bear in mind further that Kant’s 
view (articulated in the resolution of the second Antinomy) is that objects in space 
are not infinitely divided but infinitely divisible: for any region R filled with an 
object, any subregion of that region is a region that could have a part in it.47 So 
I think we should formulate (ii) as follows: for every region R explored by some 
experience, and for every object x represented in R by some experience, and for 
every subregion of R occupied by x, there is some experience that represents an 
object in that subregion (a part of x). With respect to (iii) we need to impose the 
requirement that for every formally contingent property F and for every bounded 
region R of space and every experience that represents an object in that region, 
there is an experience that represents that object as determinate with respect to 
property F.48 In other words, we need to require that the series of experiences is 
unbounded in spatial extent, domain of objects, and range of properties. I will 
refer to such a series as an unbounded series of ever more complete experiences.
Since universal experience is not any of the experiences in this series (because 
any of these experiences is incomplete relative to experiences later in the series) its 
content must supervene on the contents of the experiences in the series. But this 
is only possible if there is, in some sense to be specified, agreement in the content 
of the experiences that constitute the series. If each experience is radically revised 
by the next experience in the series, then there will be no answer to the question: 
what does a universal experience supervening on this series represent?
We can simultaneously specify the way in which the content of universal expe-
rience supervenes on the content of the experiences in the series and make precise 
the vague idea of ‘agreement’ among the contents of the experiences in the series 
by applying the mathematical notion of a limit. The formally contingent properties 
of spatiotemporal objects that Kant’s account is meant to ground are magnitudes, 
47A525/B553.
48Readers concerned that this depends upon the transcendental illusion of assuming that the com-
plete space of possible properties is ‘given’ should see Stang (2012) for further discussion, as 
well as Stang (2016a, pp. 290–292).
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that is, properties that can be assigned a quantitative value.49 In particular, they 
will have a continuous value, representable as a real number, given some unit.50 
They will include intensive magnitudes (degree of attractive force, density, accele-
ration) as well as extensive magnitude (volume, length, etc.). So universal experi-
ence, whose content grounds which formally contingent properties spatiotemporal 
phenomena actually have, will assign numerical values to these properties. Con-
sequently, we can construct the content of universal experience as the limit of 
the contents of the experiences in the series. This will render precise the sense in 
which universal experience supervenes on the series and the sense in which the 
experiences in the series must ‘agree’ (the values they assign to various properties 
must converge—see below).
Intuitively, an unbounded series of successively more complete experiences ren-
ders a determinate verdict on the magnitude of a property of an object when the 
values the experiences in the series assign to the property converge. The experien-
ces converge to a determinate value v just in case for any ε > o there is an experi-
ence E such that for any experience E* more complete than E (symbolized E* > E) 
the difference between v and the value assigned to that property by experience E* 
is less than ε. If {En} is an unbounded series of ever more complete pch-experien-
ces (En > Em if and only if n > m) and Fn
x represents the value assigned to property 
F for object x by experience En, then this means that the series {Fn
x} converges to a 
value v. We can thus fill in the blank in (Prop) from §3 in full generality as follows:
(Prop.7)   Where x is an object in space and time, x has formally contingent pro-
perty F with value v, if and only if [(a discursive spatiotemporal intel-
lect has an unbounded series of ever more complete experiences) → 
(the series of values those experiences assign to F for x converge to v)].
50The continuity of the extensive magnitude of objects (between any two extensive magnitudes 
an intermediate magnitude is possible) follows from the continuity of space (A169/B211). The 
continuity of intensive magnitude is more complicated; Kant argues for it in the Anticipations 
of Perception (B208). The Anticipations of Perception, and the idea of continuity and intensive 
magnitude, became deeply significant for Cohen’s Kant interpretation and his systematic philoso-
phy, starting with the publication of PIM in 1883 and continuing with KTE2 in 1885; see his dis-
cussion of Kant’s theory of intensive magnitudes in PIM, 105–113, and KTE3, 538–562, as well 
as the discussion of these themes in his systematic work LRE, 418–420, 462–464.
49In KrV Kant argues that all objects of experience überhaupt have quantitatively determinate 
extensive magnitudes (Axioms of Intuition, A161/B202) and intensive magnitudes (Antici-
pations of Perception, A165/B207). This is what makes possible the application of mathema-
tics to objects of experience in general. In MAdN he argues for the more specific claim that all 
bodies (outer objects composed of matter, the movable in space) have quantitatively determinate 
motions (Phoronomy), fill quantitatively determinate regions of space (Dynamics), and exert 
quantitatively determinate forces upon one another (Mechanics). This is what makes possible the 
application of mathematics to bodies. An extensive magnitude is one, the representation of which 
requires representing its parts; an intensive magnitude is a degree of reality, not possessed in vir-
tue of having a multiplicity of parts. Kant’s categorization of various magnitudes (e.g. velocity, 
mass, force) as either intensive or extensive is complicated and I cannot go into the details here.
christian.damboeck@univie.ac.at
32 N.F. Stang
The convergence of this series is defined as above.
I will conclude this section by noting two desirable features of this construc-
tion. First of all, it does not assume that universal experience will converge for 
every property of every object. For instance, the location and velocity of bodies 
will not converge, for as we proceed to ever greater reference frames (ever more 
complete experiences) the series of positions and velocities assigned to a given 
body (e.g. the Earth) will diverge. This entails that there is no determinate fact 
of the matter about the position or velocity of bodies; the determinate formally 
contingent properties they actually possess are, for instance, their position (and 
velocity) relative to other bodies in a given inertial frame and their acceleration. 
It makes no sense to ask whether a body is moving or at rest or where it is loca-
ted simpliciter, but it does make sense to ask what the magnitude of its accelera-
tion is simpliciter. Secondly, this construction can easily make room for the idea 
that objects may not have fully determinate values with respect to certain proper-
ties, but may only possess properties within a range of values. The construction 
can make room for this possibility by replacing the value v with a range of values 
[v – δ, v + δ] where the difference between this interval and Fn
x is understood as the 
maximum difference between Fn
x and any point in [v – δ, v + δ]. If that difference 
(between Fn
x and [v – δ, v + δ]) converges then object x determinately has property 
F with a value within the range [v – δ, v + δ] but does not possess any fully deter-
minate value within that range.51
The construction of universal experience proposed so far, (Prop.7), applies only 
to the formally contingent properties of objects that are magnitudes (continuously 
gradable properties). It will not apply to the existence of objects, because exis-
tence is not a magnitude (because it is not a real predicate at all), so it is not, by 
itself, an answer to (Ex) from above. However, a corresponding version of (Ex) 
can easily be formulated. It might be that some experience in a series posits the 
existence of an object of a particular kind (one with formally contingent property 
F), but ‘later’ experiences in the series (more complete experiences) would reject 
that posit. For instance, one experience would posit the existence of a magne-
tic field, while a later more complete experience rejects this posit in favor of an 
immediate magnetic action-at-a-distance (without a material medium). What cor-
responds, in the case of existence, to a series of experiences converging on a parti-
cular value, is a series in which one experience posits the existence of an object of 
a particular kind, and every experience more complete than that experience posits 
the same object. We will say that an unbounded series of ever more complete 
experiences converges to the existence of an F just in case there is some experi-
ence E in the series that represents an F as existing (its content includes: there is 
an x such that Fx), and every experience more complete than E represents an F as 
existing (its content includes: there is an x such that Fx). We can then ‘fill in’ the 
blank in (Ex) as follows:
51This is a desirable feature of the construction because it allows for a middle way between the 
extremes of an object being wholly indeterminate with respect to a property or having a fully 
determinate value with respect to that property.
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(Ex.7)   There is actually an object in space and time that has formally contin-
gent property F if and only if [(a discursive spatiotemporal intellect has 
an unbounded series of more complete experiences) → (that series con-
verges to the existence of an F)].
Note this does not mean that for any experience in the series that posits the exis-
tence of an F, every experience more complete than it will also posit the existence 
of an F. All that is required is that there is some point in the series where an F is 
posited, and ‘after’ that point that posit is never rejected.
Universal experience is not any member in such a series, nor is it entirely 
accurate to describe it as the whole series itself. The series, recall, may include 
experiences whose content is later rejected or radically revised: “wenn man von 
verschiedenen Erfahrungen spricht, so sind es nur so viel Wahrnehmungen, sofern 
solche zu einer und derselben allgemeinen Erfahrung gehören” (A110). So it 
would not be correct to assume that all experiences in a series are parts of univer-
sal experience itself. Instead, my analysis of universal experience shows univer-
sal experience not to be any individual entity—not the series, not any element in 
the series. Instead, we have shown how to translate claims about universal expe-
rience into claims about such an unbounded converging series of more complete 
experiences. We can intelligibly make claims with a determinate truth-value about 
universal experience, but there is no individual item in our ontology that can be 
identified as universal experience. But this is precisely what we should expect. For 
every experience, there can be a more complete experience, so universal experi-
ence is not an experience or object of experience. Universal experience is what 
Kant calls a ‘regulative idea’: an idea of a complete totality that can never be pre-
sented in or manifested by (pch-)experience but which guides our rational inquiry 
into nature. Similarly, the world as a complete totality of objects in space and 
time is not a possible object of (pch-)experience, so there is no item in our onto-
logy that can be identified as the world. But we can give claims about the world a 
determinate truth-value; for instance, it is false that the world is finite, because for 
any world-part there is a larger world-part that contains it. Similarly, we can give 
determinate truth-values to claims about universal experience by translating them 
into claims about unbounded complete series of more complete experiences.
5  Cohen’s Theory of Experience
In §1 I argued that Kant sometimes uses the term ‘experience’ not to refer to a per-
ceptual episode of a given subject, but to something I called ‘universal experience.’ 
In §2 I argued that universal experience plays an important role in Kant’s tran-
scendental idealism: it grounds the actual formally contingent properties of spa-
tiotemporal objects. In §3 I offered a ‘limit’ construction of universal experience, 
according to which its content is the asymptotic limit of a converging sequence 
of ever more complete causal-hypothetical experiences. In this section, I conclude 
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by bringing all of this back to the original topic of this article: Hermann Cohen’s 
interpretation of Erfahrung in KTE.
“Kant invented a new concept of experience,” Cohen writes at the begin-
ning of KTE. Before going on to characterize Cohen’s own positive account of 
what Erfahrung is, it is important to be clear on what kind of interpretation he 
is rejecting. While this point is less clear in KTE1, in KTE2 it is abundantly clear 
that Cohen is opposed to any conception of Erfahrung that takes it to be what I 
will call a ‘psychological’ notion: Erfahrung does not refer, according to Cohen, 
to conscious mental or perceptual episodes in individual subjects’ minds.52 On 
any such ‘psychological’ conception of experience, ‘experience’ is a count noun: 
my experience is a different experience than yours, and my experience now is a 
different experience than my experience ten minutes ago. Cohen’s rejection of 
this notion of experience is part and parcel of his rejection of the idea that Kant 
is giving a theory of cognitive processes or a psychological theory of any kind. 
While I think there is more psychology in Kant’s theory than Cohen allows for (at 
least by the time of KTE2), my arguments up to this point make clear that Cohen is 
correct, to this extent: there is a central (perhaps the central) notion of experience 
in Kant that is not ‘psychological’ in this sense and not individual (there is only 
one u-experience). It is what I have called u-experience.
In KTE Cohen identifies Erfahrung as mathematical natural science.53 In and of 
itself this is somewhat vague, so we must do some work to understand it. Thinking 
of Erfahrung as ‘science’ can mislead us, if we think of science as consisting of 
theories, i.e. discursive artifacts created by human beings. Erfahrung is not itself 
a scientific ‘theory,’ although, like a scientific theory, it has a content more deter-
minate than any perceptual episode or sequence of such episodes in an individual 
consciousness. In this context it might be helpful to recall Kant’s own definition of 
Wissenschaft in the Jäsche Logik: “vom Wissen kommt Wissenschaft her, worun-
ter der Inbegriff einer Erkenntniß als System zu verstehen ist” (Ak. 9:72). Borro-
wing this idea, we can say that Erfahrung, for Cohen, is (at least) systematically 
unified knowledge of its object. Erfahrung is natural science insofar as its object 
is nature, all objects in space and time. That Erfahrung is mathematical natural 
science (Naturwissenschaft) means that its content is mathematical: it represents 
its object (nature) as having quantitative properties that stand in mathematical 
relations. As I argued in §3, the properties u-experience represents its objects as 
having are magnitudes, which necessitated the complex limit construction I gave 
in that section.
52Cohen’s anti-psychologism is complicated in KTE1 by his (atavistic?) commitment to Herbar-
tian psychology (KTE1, pp. 122, 128); in KTE2 and KTE3 he is more clearly opposed to any psy-
chological interpretation of Erfahrung. See Beiser 2010, p. 487 (as well as Edel’s Introduction in 
KTE3, p. 19*) on the Herbartian strand in KTE1.
53“Kants Aufgabe ist also zunächst die Prüfung und Kennzeichnung des Erkenntniswertes und 
des Gewissheitsgrundes der Netwonschen Naturwissenshcaft, welche er be dem Drohwort der 
Erfahrung fasste” (KTE3, p. 93).
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Insofar as this is what Cohen means by saying in KTE1 that Erfahrung is 
mathematical natural science his interpretation is partly vindicated by the argu-
ments of §§ 1–3. However, already in KTE1 and increasingly in KTE2, Cohen has 
a tendency to identify Erfahrung specifically with Newtonian mathematical natural 
science. The question is, what does Cohen mean by characterizing Kantian expe-
rience as specifically Newtonian mathematical natural science? There are at least 
three things Cohen might mean by this. First, he might mean merely that Kantian 
experience is inspired by Newton and has some overlap in content with Newton’s 
theory. Secondly, he might mean to identify Kantian experience with Newton’s 
specific theory of heavenly motion in Philosophiae naturalis principia mathema-
tica. Thirdly, he might mean something intermediate between the weak first rea-
ding and the strong (and implausible) second reading: that Newton’s theory, like 
Kantian universal experience, constructs its object—nature—in a sense of ‘const-
ruction’ to be explicated below.
Regarding the first reading, one clear source for Kant’s idea of an unbounded 
series of more complete experiences, whose asymptotic limit is universal expe-
rience, is the Newtonian project of determining the true motions of bodies with 
respect to ever more complete cosmic reference frames (from the solar system, 
to the Milky Way, etc.).54 What is more, Kant thinks that universal experience 
of matter has specifically Newtonian content: it represents bodies as obeying the 
Newtonian laws of motion and as exerting a universal immediate attractive force 
on one another. The project of MAdN is to introduce “principles for the construc-
tion of the concepts that belong to the possibility of matter,”55 which I interpret to 
mean: specifying the a priori rules by which we transform the perception of matter 
into experience of matter. In terms of my distinctions among different senses of 
Erfahrung in Kant’s system, this means: transforming mere p-experience of mat-
ter (experience of a body as intersubjectively accessible) into pch-experience of 
matter (experience of a body that abstracts from sensory content due to the contin-
gent nature of my sense organs from and the particular position and motion of my 
reference frame).56 Kant argues in MAdN that experience of matter in this sense 
requires that we represent matter as obeying Newton’s three laws of motion and 
as exerting an immediate attractive force on all other matter. Since universal expe-
rience of matter is the asymptotic limit of an unbounded series of more complete 
such experiences of matter, universal experience of matter will also have a New-
tonian content. It will represent matter as obeying Newton’s three laws of motion 
and exerting an immediate attractive force on all other matter.
54See the references to Friedman in note 44.
55MAdN, Ak. 4:472.
56Ak. 4:298. I cannot here go into detail on the my interpretation of the relation among the dif-
ferent senses of experience distinguished in §2 and the Prolegomena distinction between judg-
ments of perception and judgments of experience.
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However, regarding the second reading, Cohen would be wrong to read Kant as 
assuming the truth of Newtonian natural science as a fact57 and engaging merely 
in the regressive search for the conditions of its possibility. In the KrV Kant argues 
for the claim that nature is quantitatively and causally determinate, and that mathe-
matical natural science in general is therefore possible. In MAdN he argues further 
that objectively valid experience of matter must have specifically Newtonian con-
tent and thus grounds the possibility of Newtonian science. He assumes neither the 
possibility of mathematical natural science nor the actuality of specifically Newto-
nian natural science.58
But a reading intermediate between the almost vacuous first reading and the 
highly implausible second reading is possible: Cohen may mean that Kantian 
experience is Newtonian in the sense that it ‘constructs’ its object, nature. What 
exactly ‘construction’ means for Kant or for Cohen (or, for that matter, Newton) 
is a complex question to which I cannot give anything more than a sketch of an 
answer here. But even this sketch will help us to see that, in characterizing Kan-
tian (universal) experience as Newtonian (read: constructive) mathematical natural 
science, Cohen is not necessarily misreading Kant. Whatever ‘construction’ means 
it is clear that it does not mean, either for Cohen or for Kant, literal creation. Kant 
and Cohen are united in their opposition to any kind of subjective idealism on 
which the object of experience, nature, is caused to exist by the intellectual activity 
of human subjects.59 In MAdN, the text in which Kant is most closely engaged 
with Newton, Kant describes himself as introducing “Principien der Construction 
der Begriffe, welche zur Möglichkeit der Materie überhaupt gehören”60 which I 
read as meaning: providing the a priori rules by which we transform mere percep-
tion of motion into experience. Building on the interpretation in §§ 2–3 we can 
say further that these a priori rules make possible pch-experience of matter, the 
pch-experiences that constitute the ‘stages’ in the converging series by which we 
define universal experience. So the ‘objective’ motions of bodies, the motions they 
actually have (not merely the motions they possible have, or are experienced to 
have at one or another pch-experience stage), are defined in terms of a sequence 
of pch-experiences structured according to these a priori rules. What it is for a 
58Various scholars have made the point that Cohen effectively conflates the “analytic” method 
of the Prolegomena with the “synthetic” method of the KrV; see Beiser (2014, p. 489) and Luft 
(2015, pp. 224–225). In Cohen’s defense, he is aware of this distinction and explicitly argues that 
Kant in fact adopts an analytic or regressive method in the KrV.
59One might think that we can address the sense in which we ‘construct’ nature in experience by 
appeal to Kant’s theory of geometric construction in pure intuition, but there are two barriers to 
this. First, Kant distinguishes between objects of pure intuition (mathematical objects) and con-
crete causally efficacious objects in space and time, the objects that constitute nature, the objects 
of experience (mathematical natural science). Construction of the latter, whatever it is, is going 
to be quite different than construction of the latter. Secondly, the whole notion of mathematical 
construction in pure intuition is itself a complex one in Kant, so we might be in danger of explain 
obscurum per obscurius.
60Ak. 4:472.
57What Cohen calls “das Faktum der Wissenschaft” (KTE1, pp. 41, 94).
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body to have a particular motion is defined in terms of pch-experiences which are 
themselves constructed according to these a priori rules. Abstracting slightly from 
the technical terminology of Kantian philosophy (a priori rules, etc.), we can say 
that from this perspective Newton’s laws are not merely observed regularities in 
the motions of planets, nor do they merely give us epistemic warrant for making 
judgments about those motions: they are partly constitutive of those motions them-
selves. It is not as though we have some independent grasp on the notion of the 
objective motions of bodies and then we either observe that the laws are obeyed 
by these motions, or these laws give us warrant to make judgments about those 
motions; the concept of the objective motions of bodies has no meaning for us 
unless we represent them as the motions bodies have in a reference frame in 
which those laws are obeyed, an inertial frame. The laws of motion, on this rea-
ding, ‘construct’ their object in that they make that object itself possible. If this is 
what Cohen means by calling Kantian experience Newtonian mathematical natu-
ral science, then he is correct, insofar as we follow Kant’s understanding of New-
ton. Kantian experience is Newtonian insofar as it takes its most fundamental laws 
(the transcendental principles of experience) not to be observed regularities, but 
constitutive principles that make its object (motion).61 Thus we see that Cohen’s 
long-decried reading of Kant is correct in what is perhaps its most central claim: 
Kantian experience is Newtonian (because constructive) mathematical (because its 
content is quantitative) natural (because its object is nature as a whole) science 
(because it is systematic cognition of that object).
Another aspect of Cohen’s interpretation of Kant partly vindicated by my own 
account is his notorious identification of things in themselves (Dinge an sich 
selbst) with the limit of natural scientific inquiry. In both the first and second edi-
tions of Kants Theorie der Erfahrung Cohen identifies things in themselves not 
with a separate realm of objects distinct from phenomena (so-called ‘two object’ 
readings) nor with an unknowable inner properties of phenomena (the now domi-
nant metaphysical ‘one object’ reading) nor with a ‘transcendental’ perspective on 
objects that abstracts from the specifically spatiotemporal conditions of our cog-
nition of them (the ‘epistemological’ reading made famous in English-language 
scholarship by Henry Allison).62 Cohen identifies the concept of the thing in itself 
with the concept of objects as they would be represented at the never-to-be-obtai-
ned limit of experience, the ‘final’ theory of them in natural science. The critical 
function of the concept of the thing in itself, according to Cohen, is to remind 
61My argument here, even some of my formulations, are clearly indebted to the work of Michael 
Friedman here. However, given my explicit construction of universal experience and my more 
‘idealist’ reading of how phenomena depend on universal experience (see §§ 2–3) I claim 
something stronger than Friedman: what it is for an object to have a certain motion is for it to be 
represented as having that motion in a universal experience whose stages are constructed using 
Newtonian laws. I do not have the space here to explore this deviation from Friedman’s less 
‘metaphysical’ reading.
62For this tripartite classification of interpretations of transcendental idealism see the classic 
paper Ameriks (1982).
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us that we have never reached ‘final science,’ that our experience, no matter how 
complete, could always be more complete. Experience is indefinitely continuable 
and cannot be given to us as an actual infinite totality.
My interpretation of Kant’s theory of experience retains a role for the idea of 
the asymptotic limit of an unbounded series of ever more complete experiences: 
the actual properties of phenomena are the properties represented at this asymptotic 
limit. This means that the asymptotic limit of experience is associated, not with the 
‘transcendental’ distinction between things and themselves and appearances, with 
which Cohen and most commentators on Kant’s idealism are primarily concerned, 
but the ‘empirical’ distinction between how phenomena appear to us at any particu-
lar stage in perception or (pch-)experience and the empirical properties they really 
have. Kant explains this distinction through the example of a rose: “in diesem Falle 
gilt das, was ursprünglich selbst nur Erscheinung ist, z. B. eine Rose, im empiri-
schen Verstande für ein Ding an sich selbst, welches doch jedem Auge in Ansehung 
der Farbe anders erscheinen kann” (A29/B45). This is the distinction between the 
properties we attribute to the phenomena on the basis of the subjective constitution 
of our sense organs (e.g. their color) and properties they objectively possess (e.g. 
extension). It is a distinction within the empirical cognizable properties of bodies, 
so it is not a transcendental distinction between objects as they appear (phenomena) 
and as they are in themselves (noumena). On my interpretation, the properties the 
rose actually possesses are the properties it would be represented as having in the 
asymptotic limit of a series of ever more complete experiences (see previous sec-
tion).63 Thus, from my perspective Cohen is right to identify the thing in itself as 
the limit of natural scientific inquiry, but only if we restrict this to the ‘empirical’ 
concept of a thing in itself: a phenomenon as it is in itself, independently of how it 
is pch-experienced by any particular subject at any particular time.
There are other aspects of Cohen’s Kant interpretation that, for reasons of 
space, I have not addressed here — e.g. his non-psychological reading of the a 
priori, the idea of the ‘transcendental,’ the subordination of sensibility to thought 
in KTE2, etc. I do hope, however, to have convinced the reader that, while Cohen’s 
interpretation of Kant’s theory of experience cannot be endorsed without qualifi-
cation, it contains a kernel of insight that contemporary Kant scholars should not 
ignore. But neither should scholars of Cohen. If I am right that Cohen’s interpre-
tation of Kant’s theory of Erfahrung is, in broad strokes, correct, then our under-
standing of Marburg Neo-Kantianism, which often operates under the (at least) 
implicit assumption that the Marburg reading of Kant is fundamentally a misrea-
ding, may need to be revised.64
63In a parallel discussion at A45/B63, Kant distinguishes between a rainbow as an appearance 
in the empirical sense (in which it is colored) and as a thing in itself in the empirical sense (in 
which it is a collection of colorless raindrops). He identifies the rainbow ‘in itself’ as the rainbow 
as it is represented in “allgemeine Erfahrung.”
64I would like to thank Christian Damböck and the audience at a conference at the University of 
Vienna in the Fall of 2014 for their questions and feedback on an earlier draft of this paper. Spe-
cial thanks also to Ian Drummond for excellent copy-editing.
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Abbreviations for Works of Cohen
KTE  Kants Theorie der Erfahrung. Superscript indicates edition: 1st edition 
(1871) in Werke I.3, 3rd edition (1918) in Werke I.1, which also contains 
marginal paginations for the 2nd edition (1885)
LRE  Logik der reinen Erkenntnis (1914). 4th edition. Werke 6
PIM Prinzip der Infinitesimal-Methode und seine Geschichte (1883). In Werke 5
Werke  Hermann Cohen, Werke. Ed. Hermann-Cohen Archiv am Philosophischen 
Seminar der Universität Zürich unter der Leitung von Helmut Holzhey. 
Hildesheim, Zürich, New York: Georg Olms, 1984
Abbreviations for Works of Kant
Ak.  Kants gesammelte Schriften (vols. 1–29). Berlin-Brandenburg (formerly: 
Royal Prussian) Academy of Sciences (eds.). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 
1902. Cited by volume and page number
KrV  Kritik der reinen Vernunft (A:1781, B:1787). Ak. 3 (B) and 4: 1–252 (A)
MAdN  Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft (1786). Ak. 4: 
465–566
Prol.  Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik die als Wissenschaft 
wird
   auftreten können (1783). Ak. 4: 253–384
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